Lessons from Kindergarten: Recovering Remediation Costs under the Citizens\u27 Suit Provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act by Schmittgens, Eugene P., Jr. & Nelson, Douglas E.
Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 1995 
Article 2 
1995 
Lessons from Kindergarten: Recovering Remediation Costs under 
the Citizens' Suit Provision of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act 
Eugene P. Schmittgens Jr. 
Douglas E. Nelson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eugene P. Schmittgens Jr. and Douglas E. Nelson, Lessons from Kindergarten: Recovering Remediation 
Costs under the Citizens' Suit Provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act , 3 Mo. Envtl. L. & 
Pol'y Rev. 63 (1995) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol3/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an 











by Eugene P. Schmittgens, Jr. and Douglas E. Nelson'
"Put things back where your found them.
Clean up your own mess."
ROBERT FUGHUM,




On March 1, 1995, in KFC West-
ern, Inc. v. Meghrig,2 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that citizens
could recover abatement costs under the
citizens' suit provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)3.
The court in KFC extended the Eighth
Circuit's holdings in United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemi-
col Co.(NEPACCO), and United States
v. Acelo Agricultural Chemicals Corp.,s
which held the Administrator could re-
covery her clean up costs under the equi-
table theory of restitution.
This paper will examine th
for extending the right of citiz
cover abatement costs prosec
RCRA. The authors will also r
common arguments made by
posing such actions.
In the final analysis, allowi
to recover their costs provides
efficient application of the sta
couraging remediation of con
sites. Such encouragement w
reduce the risk to the public b
ing cleanups, but will also pre
culpable from escaping liabilit
II. RCRA Is AN EQUTABL
AND AN AWARD OF RESTF
WITHIN THE EQUITABLEJURISD
THE COURTS.
A. Analysis of RCRA's
Suit Provision.
Lessons
I Eugene P. Schminigens, Jr. is a 1982 graduate of St. Louis University School of Law. He currently is a partner in ihe St. Louis, Missouri Law Firm of Cossely,
Jones, Briffinghom & Edwards, P.C., where his practice is concentrated in the area of environmental law.
Douglas E. Nelson, is a 1990 graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. He is currenily employed as on Assistant Altorney General for
the State of Missouri, where he practices in the area of environmental law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge ihe assistance of Professor Douglas Williams of Si. Louis University School of Law for his insights in the drafting of this article.
2 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995). Immediately prior to this volume of the Missouri Environmenial law & Policy Review going to print, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. 11 was, therefore, impossible to incorporate the Supreme Court's decision into this article. For Ihose with
Interest, the Supreme Court's decision can be found at No. 95-83, 1996 WL 117012 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1996).
3 42 U.S.C. § 6901.
4 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
5 872 F.2d 1372 18th Cir. 19891.
6 H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pl. 1, at 53 11984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 5576, 5612.
7 Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 315 (6th Cir. 1985).
9 H.R. REP. No. 198, 981h Cong., 2d Sess., pl. 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.9 Id
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In 1984, Congress amended RCRA
ten: by enacting the Hazardous and SolidWaste Amendments of 1984. Among
ethe changes made was an "expansions of the citiz ns' suit provision" of RCRA.
Prior to the amendments, RCRA's citi-
S it zens' suit provision gave the distri courtrjurisdictionto "enforce any order or
regulation "or to order the Administrator
i rce to perform such act or duty as the case
may be."y The 1984 Amendments ex-
panded the Court's jurisdiction regard-Act ing orders it could issue. The expansion
was designed to "complement, rather
than conflict with, the Administrator's
efforts to eliminate threats to public
health and the environment, particularly
rtoaewhere the Government is unable to take
s rtonale- action because of inadequate re-
Ited under sourc s. Congress endecRAy enized that a citizen can sue under the
section "pursuant to the standards of i-parties op- ability established under Section
ng itiens7003."' Courts which fail to recognizefog citieof the right to restitution fail to enforce the
ore ay moe Congressional intent behind RCRA andte by en- to follow the precedent of a number of
11tminte federal courts.i not only The "citizens' suit" provision of
.went those RCRA, set out at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a),now defines the jurisdiction of a court in
a citizen suit action thusly:
SThe district court shall have juris-
pnSTAUTErdiction, without regard to
UIwON IS amount and controversy or the
ICTION OF citizenship of the parties, ... to
restrain any person who has
Citizens' contributed or is contributing to
the past or present handling,
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storage, treatment, transporto-
tion, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste referred to in
paragraph (1)(B), to order such
person to take such other action
as may be necessary, or both,
or to order the Administrator to
perform the act or duly referred
to in paragraph (2)....io
While § 6972(a) allows any person to
commence a civil action on his own be-
half, § 6973 addresses the right of ac-
tion given to the United States. Section
6973 provides:
The Administrator may bring suit
on behalf of the United States in
the appropriate district court
against any person (including
any past or present generator,
past or present transporter or
post or present owner or opera-
tor of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility) who has con-
tributed or who is contributing to
such handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation or disposal
to restrain such person from
such handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or dis-
posal, to order such person to
take such other action as may
be necessary, or both.
Pursuant to § 6973, the Administra-
tor may seek an order to "restrain such
person from such handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal.""
The Administrator may also invoke other
kinds of equitable relief, such as asking
the court "to order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary,
or both."l 2
The language of RCRA's citizens suit
provision is nearly identical to that of the
"imminent hazard" provision of § 6973.
Given this nearly identical language,
courts have concluded that the
"regulatory language referring to §
7003 must also apply to §
7002(a)(1)(B) because the two
provisions are nearly identical."" Ac-
cordingly, the remedies available to pri-
vate parties pursuant to § 7002(a)(1)(B)
closely track those that are available to
EPA under § 7003.
In fact, as the court in Middlesex
County Board of Chosen Freeholders v.
New Jerseyu noted, the 1984 amend-
ment to § 7002 "is designed to provide
a private means of obtaining the same
relief that the EPA Administrator has pre-
viously been authorized to seek under
RCRA by § 7003."" Thus, cases which
hold that § 7003 provides for the equi-
table remedy of restitution are relevant to
actions brought pursuant to §
7002(a)(1)(B). Unfortunately for the citi-
zen, however, many courts have failed
to afford them the equitable remedy of
restitution.
B. Cases Interpreting RCRA's
Remedies.
Pursuant to § 7003, courts have
ruled that restitution will lie to reimburse
the government for costs expended in
remediating a site and to ensure that jus-
tice is done. In United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co.,' 6 the Eighth Circuit found that resti-
tution for costs expended in remediating
contamination is appropriate relief under
RCRA § 7003. There it stated that
"[w]hen the government seeks to recover
its response costs under CERCLA or its
abatement costs under RCRA it is in ef-
fect seeking equitable relief in the form of
restitution or reimbursement of the costs it
expended in order to respond to the
health and environmental danger pre-
sented by hazardous substances." 7
Some discussion of the facts in
NEPACCO is appropriate. NEPACCO
disposed of wastes on a farm south of
Verona, Missouri.18  Thereafter, the
United States received an anonymous tip
that wastes had been disposed of at the
farm and that the geology of the farm
was not suitable for such disposal."
The government undertook remediation
of the property. Suit was later filed
against a number of parties including the
owner of the plant, NEPACCO, the gen-
erator of the wastes, the corporate offi-
cers who arranged for the disposal of
the wastes, and the transporter of the
waste. The United States sought reim-
bursement of response costs under RCRA§ 7003. The district court held that re-
covery of response costs was compara-
ble to restitution and thus an equitable
remedy.20
The RCRA count was an alternative
theory of recovery for the government. 1
Although the Court remanded the case
to consider whether response costs un-
der CERCLA were available to the
United States, the Court stated that
"because the government also sought to
recover the response costs it incurred be-
fore the enactment of CERCLA in the
form of equitable relief as abatement
costs under RCRA, on remand the district
court could grant the government such
to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
12 Id.
1 Connecticut Coastal Fishermen v. Remington Arms, 989 F. 2d 1305, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1993) (citing Comile Pro Rescate de la Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority, 888 F.2d 180, 187 (Ist Cir. 19891), ceit. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990).
" 645 F. Supp. 715 (D.NJ. 1986).
is 645 F. Supp. at 721.
16 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8h Cir. 1986).
1 810 F.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 72930.
9 Id. at 730.
2 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (MA. C1. App. 1984).
21 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 737-38 (8th Cir. 1986).
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costs as a matter of equitable discre-
tion." 22 Thus, the recovery of abatement
costs under the identical language of §
7003 is clearly established.
Restitution as a viable remedy under
RCRA is supported by other precedent.
In United Slates v. Price,23 the federal
government sought injunctive relief to
remedy contamination caused by the
past disposal of hazardous substances
at a landfill. The government also
sought to have the landfill fund studies
regarding threats to the public water
supply and to provide for alternative wa-
ter supplies to those whose wells have
been contaminated.24 A preliminary in-
junction was denied.2s
On appeal, while affirming the de-
nial of the injunction, the Third Circuit
ruled that the trial court had "expressed
an unduly restrictive view of its remedial
powers under traditional equitable doc-
trines as well as under the endangerment
provisions of RCRA." 26 As such, the de-
cision examined at length the power of
a court to "fashion any remedy deemed
necessary and appropriate to do justice
in the particular case." 27
Although the court found that the dis-
trict court had authority under § 7003 to
order defendants to fund the study, it sus-
tained the denial of the preliminary in-
junction as within thedistrict court's
discretion.28 It held that a more practi-
cal solution was to have EPA undertake
the study since "[r]eimbursement could
thereafter be directed against those par-
ties ultimately found to be liable."2
In U.S. v. Conservation Chemical
Co.,30 the court interpreted § 6973 to
give "[t]he court ... broad authority un-
der §7003 [§ 6973] to grant the equi-
table relief necessary to eliminate the
endangerment."' The court went on to
discuss that RCRA imposed joint and sev-
eral liability and gave the court broad
power to order whatever relief was nec-
essary to abate the applicable hazard.
Further, the United States argued the
costs were recoverable in an action pur-
suant to § 6973 because that section
authorized prohibitory injunctions and
"such other action as may be neces-
sary."30 The court found this language
granted the United States "the -full equity
powersof the federal courts in the effort
to protect the public health, environment,
and public water supplies from the perni-
cious effects of toxic wastes."0' The
court concluded that the government, in
seeking relief in the form of recovery of
its costs, sought the equitable remedy of
restitution. It concluded this was appro-
priate relief in an action under §
6973.3s The court expressed the view
that "unlike response costs under § 107
of CERC[A (42 U.S.C. § 9607), such
cost recovery devolves purely from the
court's exercise of -equitable discretion
and must necessarily await a full and
detailed analysis of the equities of the
cOse." 36
The decision in Conservation Chemi-
col is consistent not only with a correct
reading of NEPACCO, but also with the
Eighth Circuit's holding in U.S. v. Aceto
Agricultural and Chemicals Corp.17 The
court in Aceto held that the express lan-
guage of § 6973 permits suit as soon
as the United States receives information
indicating a potential endangerment."
The court stated that the purpose of the
statute is to "give broad authority to the
courts to grant all relief necessary to en-
sure complete protection of the public
health and environment."" The court
went on to emphasize that RCRA, much
like CERCIA, is a remedial statute which
should be liberollyconstrued.o Making
restitution available is a natural result of
that conclusion. In fact, in Aceto, the
court stated "that RCRA's imminent and
substantial endangerment language
does not require the EPA to file and
prosecute its RCRA action while the en-
dangerment exists. In a context of a re-
imbursement action, this would be an
'absurd and unnecessary' require-
ment." 4' Any holding which does not
22 810 F.2d a1750.
" 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 19821.
24 688 F.2d at 207-8.
25 Id. at 208.
26 Id at 211.
27 td.
2e 688 F.2d 204.
29 Id. of 214. Moreover, the Price decision was coined by Congress. The Senate Report on the 1984 Amendments to RCRA quoted with approval the statement
found in Pike (688 F.2d at 213-214) that § 7003 is "intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to
eliminate any risks posed by toxic wastes." S. RE. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1984).
3 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
21 619 F. Supp. of 199, citing S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1984) (stating § 6973 "is intended to confer upon ihe courts the authority to grant
affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes'1.
32 Id.
22 Id. at 201.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id.
3 Id.
37 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Or. 1989).
n' Id.
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allow restitution discourages private per-
sons from themselves bringing suit based
on an "imminent and substantial" dan-
ger from hazardous materials.
C. Application of Equitable Princi-
ples to RCRA's Citizens' Suit Provision.
The decisions in Price, Conservation
Chemical, Aceto, and NEPACCO did
not blaze new ground. Rather, the
courts adopted a long line of holdings
beginning with the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.4 2
There, the court reversed an appellate
court decision which held there was no
right to restitution under a statute which
granted the authority to sue "for an order
enforcing compliance with such provi-
sion, and upon a showing by the Admin-
istrator that such person has engaged or
is about to engage in any such acts or
practices a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order
shall be granted without bond."4 The
Supreme Court held:
Unless otherwise provided by
statute, all the inherent equitable
powers of the District Court are
available for the proper and
complete exercise of that juris-
diction. And since the public
interest is involved in a proceed-
ing of this nature, those equita-
ble powers assume an even
broader and more flexible char-
acter than when only a private
controversy is at stake. ... Power
is thereby resident in the District
Court, in exercising this jurisdic-
tion, "to do equity and to mold
each decree to the necessities
of the particular case." ... It
may act so as to adjust and
reconcile competing claims and
so as to accord full justice to all
the real parties in interest; if nec-
essary, persons not originally
connected with the litigation
may be brought before the court
so that their rights in the subject
matter may be determined and
enforced. In addition, the court
may go beyond the matters im-
mediately underlying its equita-
ble jurisdiction and decide
whatever other issues and give
whatever other relief may be
necessary under the circum-
stances. Only in that way can
equity do complete rather than
truncated justice. ...
Moreover, the comprehen-
siveness of this equitable juris-
diction is not to be denied or
limited in the absence of a clear
and valid legislative command.
Unless a statute in so many
words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts
the court's jurisdiction in equity,
the full scope of that jurisdiction
is to be recognized and ap-
plied. "The great principles of
equity, securing complete jus-
tice, should not be yielded to
light inferences, or doubtful
construction."
It is readily apparent from the
foregoing that a decree compel-
ling one to disgorge profits,
rents or property acquired in
violation of the [applicable law]
may properly be entered by a
District Court once its equity ju-
risdiction has been invoked ...
Similarly, in Wyondone
Transportation Co. v. United States,"
restitution was granted to the United
States for the costs of removing, from a
waterway, a sunken vessel containing
chlorine gas. Suit was filed pursuant to
the Rivers and Harbors Acte seeking to
recover sums it expendedin removing a
barge from the Mississippi. 7 Although§ 15 of the Act gave the United States
the authority to remove the vessel and
further provided for penalties or injunc-
tive relief, there was no express right to
recover the costs expended in removing
the vessel."
Summary judgment was entered
against the United States. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding:
Having properly chosen to re-
move such vessel, the United
States should not lose the right
to place responsibility for re-
moval upon those who negli-
gently sank the vessel. ...
Wyandotte was unwilling to
effectuate removal itself. It
would be surprising if Congress
intended that, in such a situa-
tion, the Government's com-
mendable performance of
Wyandotte's duty must be at
the Government's expense.49
Finally, in Reserve Mining Co. v.
Lord,50 the court held that reimbursement
for expenditures by the United States in
removing pollutants discharged into Lake
Superior in violation of the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act was within the
jurisdiction of the district court. The dis-
trict court, on remand, found the polluter
liable for interim filtration expenses in-
curred by the United States, relying in
part upon Wyandotte.si
It is extraordinarily clear that a court
328 U.S. 395 (1946).
328 U.S. at 397.
Id. a 398 (emphasis added).
389 U.S. 191 (1967).
33 U.S.C. § 409.
389 U.S. 191.
33 U.S.C. § 409.
389 U.S. at 204-5.
529 F.2d 181, 184 (8ib Cir. 19761 (en banc).














has jurisdiction to award abatement or
remediationcosts in an action brought
under RCRA's § 7003. Since both Con-
gress has stated that a citizen may sue
"'pursuant to the standards of liability es-
tablished under Section 7003=,52 and
the courts have long ruled that § 7003
will allow for the recovery of money ex-
pended to remediate a condition, it nec-
essarily and logically follows that a
cause of action for restitution of costs
under § 7002(a)(1)(B) must lie.
Further, "when the same word or
phrase is used in different parts of a stat-
ute, [a] court presumes that word or
phrase has the same meaning through-
out."53 Courts should apply this rule to
proceedings brought under § 7002. To
do so would materially advance the pur-
pose of § 7002(a)(1)(B) to aid in the
remediation of contaminated sites.
Both H 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B)
gives the courts authority to issue prohibi-
tory injunctions and to order "such other
action as may be necessary."' 4 Section
7002, therefore, like § 7003 necessar-
ily invokes "the full equity powers of the
federal courts in the effort to protect pub-
lic health, the environment, and public
water supplies from the pernicious effects
of toxic wastes." 5
A court's decision refusing to award
restitution penalizes innocent landowners
for performing another's duty. As such,
citizen plaintiffs, like the government in
Wyondotte, performthe duties of defen-
dants. Surely, Congress did not intend
an innocent purchaser to bear the ex-
pense of performing another's duty.
Courts which have examined avail-
able equitable remedies, have univer-
sally held the right to restitution exists. In
United States v. Valentine,s6 the United
States reached a settlement agreement
with a number of defendants in a §
7003 action. Thereafter, the settling
defendants sought to file cross-claims
and third-party complaints against a
number of other defendants and other
third parties found by the district court to
be liable for fifty to ninety percent of the
problem. The theory of the cross-claims
and third-party complaints were prem-
ised upon theories of contribution and
indemnification. The non-settling defen-
donts and others opposed the motion
asserting RCRA did not allow such
actions.
The district court succinctly summa-
rized the matter by saying:
In the context of this litigation, if
Settling Defendants' motion for
leave is granted, the Settling
Defendants will recover only that
appropriate share of cleanup
costs attributable to responsible
Non-settling Defendants and
third parties. Conversely, if the
Settling Defendants' motion for
leave is denied, Settling Defen-
dants assume the entire cleanup
costs, but will have no recourse
to recover any portion of those
costs attributable to Non-settling
Defendants or third parties who
contributed to contamination of
the Site, and who otherwise are
liable to the government for
remediation of tile Site. In other
words, denial of the motion will
effectively immunize the Non-
Settling Defendants and other
responsible parties (who may
have generated from fifty to
ninety percent of the materials to
be processed from any liability
for cleanup costs.57
The court found that a right to contribu-
tion or indemnity existed.5 Rejecting the
non-settling parties' premise that there is
no right to contribution since the statute
does not expressly grant it, the court con-
cluded that
defendants have a right to con-
tribution in actions brought un-
der Section 7003. That statute
grants the Court broad authority
to foshion whatever equitable
remedies are necessary to en-
sure the protection of the public
health and environment. While
sparse, the statute's legislative
history confirms this broad grant
of authority. Moreover, recog-
nizing a right to contribution
would comport with the purpose
of the statute and serve the
unique federal interest in the ex-
peditious settlement of RCRA
actions. Therefore, a right to
contribution is both implicit in
Section 7003 and must be rec-
ognized as a matter of federal
law.59
Examining the jurisdictional authority
of § 7003 to "order such person to take
such other action as may be necessary,"
the court followed the logic of Price, and
its progeny, to grant settling defendants
the relief sought, concluding:
It is plain, therefore, that Section
7003 empowers the Court to
grant the full range of equitable
remedies and also all remedies
traditionally provided under the
common law of nuisance, at
52 H.R. REP. No. 198, 98TH Cong., Ist Sess. 1983, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 5576.
-2 S&M Investment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 328 (9h Cir. 1990).
54 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
55 United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 13d Cir. 1982).
- 856 F. Supp. 627 ID. Wyo. 1994).
s 856 F. Supp. at 630.
s The court, in footnote 3 of its opinion, addressed whether contribution or indemnity was appropriate. The Setling Defendants' proposed pleadings request both
contribulion and indemnity from the crossclaim and shirdparty defendants. For the same reasons the Court holds that a right to contribution exists under RCRA, the
Court also recognizes a right to indemnity, but acknowledges that they are mutually exclusive remedies. See RESWEMENT(SECOND)OF ToRis § 886A cml. a (19651;
Schneider National Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992). The Court expressed no opinion as to the precise term either contribution or indemnity
may take in this case. United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, n.3 (D. Wyo. 1994).
51 856 F. Supp. at 632 (emphasis added).
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least so long as such relief
serves to protect the public
health and environment. ... Ac-
cordingly, courts have awarded
the equitable remedy of restitu-
tion in cases brought under Sec-
tion 7003. ... Like restitution,
contribution is an equitable rem-
edy designed to prevent unjust
enrichment and there is no legiti-
mate reason for courts to grant
the former remedy, and yet
deny the latter.W
The court concluded that allowing the
third-party plaintiffs' requested relief
would advance the purpose of RCRA by
ensuring prompt cleanups. On that issue
the court held:
Further, granting a right to con-
tribution will serve the purposes
underlying Section 7003. ...
Contribution will encourage
early settlements between defen-
dants and the government by
granting defendants an opportu-
nity to litigate the liability of
other parties and possibly re-
coup their settlement payments
at a later date. ... Without con-
tribution, defendants either will
be forced to bear the full cost of
cleanup despite the existence of
other responsible parties or will
be deterred from settling until
after the share of every poten-
tially responsible party has been
litigated.s6
The position of the citizen seeking
restitution often is parallel to the settling
defendants in Valentine. Plaintiffs usually
are directed by some public agency to
remediate the property, although often,
they never contributed to the problem.
Denying restitution effectively immunizes
defendants from any liability. By under-
taking the remediation of the site, with-
out first litigating the liability of other
parties, the risk of harm to the public or
the environment is reduced and effi-
ciently leaves the issue of reimbursement
from other parties to a later date. There-
fore, under the reasoning above, it is
obvious that citizens must be allowed to
sue to recover their abatement costs.
Recently, the 9th Circuit in KFC West-
ern, Inc. v. Meghrig" while relying on
the 8th Circuit decision in NAPACCO
and Aceto, ruled that a private party can
sue for restitution of clean up costs under
RCRA to recover environmental clean-up
costs from prior owners of the contami-
nated property.
In this case, KFC purchased a piece
of property in 1975 .63 While construct-
ing a restaurant, contamination was dis-
covered in 1988.' At that time KFC
was ordered by the City of Los Angeles
to clean up the property at a cost of ap-
proximately two hundred eleven thou-
sand dollars ($211,000.00). KFC
brought an action under RCRA
§7002(a)(1)(B).6s The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(6) relying
on two issues: 1) There is no "imminent
and substantial endangerment" because
KFC has completed the clean-up three
years before filing the action; and 2)
RCRA authorizes suites for injunctive re-
lief only, not for damages. The district
court granted the motion."
KFC then filed an amended com-
plaint which alleged that the contami-
noted soil, at the time of the clean-up,
presented a "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to public health and the
environment by threatening surrounding
groundwater and potentially risking the
health of the people expected to use the
property. 7 The district court again
granted the defendant's motion to dis-
miss and KFC appealed.
The 9th Circuit agreed with KFC that
RCRA authorized citizen suits with re-
spect to contamination that in the past
posed imminent and substantial dan-
ger.6' The 9th Circuit, in taking its posi-
tion, relied on the 8th Circuit's
interpretation of § 7003. The court re-
lied on Aceto, particularly the language
suggesting that the section "does not re-
quire the EPA to file and prosecute its
RCRA action while the endangerment
exists." 70
Clearly, the 9th Circuit not only con-
sidered the language in Aceto, but also
the broad authority of courts to grant all
relief necessary to insure the protection
of the public health and environment.
The court, however, felt that on action
for injunctive relief would defeat that
purpose.71
The court went on to hold that KFC
was authorized under RCRA to obtain
restitution relying on the "such other ac-
tions as may be necessary" language of
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).n In reaching
6 Id. at 633.
8 Id. at 634. CI, Polger v. Republic Notional Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D. Colo. 1989) ("If . .. owners believe that they will not be allowed to recover
from others who actually generated or deposited the waste, they may decide to ignore a hazardous waste site in the hope that federal or state authorities will ether
not discover the waste, or will be unsuccessful in pinning liability, on them.").
6 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995).






69 49 F.3d at 521.
a United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989).
n KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (91h Cir. 1995).
n 49 F.3d at 527.
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that conclusion, the court considered the
intent of the citizen suit provision, and
held that it should be governed by the
same standard of reliability as govern-
mental actions.73
Because the 8th Circuit has recog-
nized the administrative' rights to sue
under § 6973 for restitution of costs in-
curred it necessarily follows that the iden-
tical language of the citizens' suit
provision should have the same result.'
The court rejected arguments of the
defendant as to the material differences
existing between the citizen suit provi-
sion set out in § § 6972(a)(1)(B) and
6973, including: a) different notice re-
quirements for filing actions; b) lack of
limitation period for RCRA citizen suites
is evidence of the unavailability of reim-
bursement actions under RCRA; and c)
case law interpreting §6972 have de-
nied the right to recover abatement
costs.
With respect to the case law, the
court disregarded Wolls v. Waste Re-
sources Corp.' and Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Lomphier,76 as
inappropriate because they were
brought under the predecessor section to
§ 6972(a)(1)(b)." The court went on to
hold that it disapproved of the other dis-
fricl court's decision holding against res-
titution instead of relying on the
interpretation of the 8th Circuit's deci-
sion regarding § 6973.'
This decision allowed an "innocent"
party who was a "responsible" party
under the applicable state or local law,
the ability to bring an action under
RCRA. The majority in KFC noted the
importance stoing that "the government
often orders innocent parties, socalled
'responsible parties' under the statute, to
remedy discovered contamination on
their property even though they did not
cause the contamination or have any ties
to the property when the contamination
occurred."79 For this reason alone, eq-
uity demands that restitution be sanc-
tioned by the courts.
Other courts, while examining their
equitable authority, have specifically
held that § 7002 allows for restitution.
For example, in both Lincoln Properties v.
Higgensso and Bayless Investment and
Trading Company v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.,"i the courts held that § 7002 pro-
vides for the recovery of remediation
costs expended under the equitable rem-
edy of restitution. Both cases.provide a
well reasoned analysis of the purposes
of the section, as well as the authority
granted district courts to decide cases
brought pursuant to the section. For ex-
ample, in Lincoln Properties, the plaintiff
filed a complaint which contained a
"RCRA claim for injunctive relief and res-
titution of abatement costs." 82 The court
granted the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgement on the RCRA claim."
Nowhere in the decision was the claim
for restitution dismissed or severed from
the court's order on the motion. In fact,
the court specifically held that the injunc-
tion could require "the same sort of finan-
cial contribution as the court could
award under CERCLA" and, citing,
Price, that defendants "may be required
to expend money' in order to comply
with the terms of an injunction." Thus,
the plaintiffs claim for reimbursement was
allowed by the court's order.
The decision in Bayless is even
clearer. There the court ruled that
[w]ith regard to Bayless' prayer
for reimbursement costs, the
court feels that this remedy is
also actionable pursuant to
RCRA f§) 7002. ... As noted
above, the citizen-suit provision
of RCRA, that Congress added
in 1984, was designed to
"invigorate citizen litigation,"
and "provide a private means
of obtaining the some relief that
the EPA Administrator had been
previously been authorized to
seek under RCRA. ... The statu-
tory enablers for private individ-
ual's suit and the government's
suit are virtually identical. ...
and as such, no compelling rea-
son exists to treat a "private at-
torney general" any differently
from a "public attorney gen-
eral" when they seek to pro-
mote the "prompt, private party
clean up" of environmental
contomination.85
Attempts to mischaracterize the plain lan-
guage of the decisions in both Lincoln
Properties and Bayless Investment should
be rejected.
Other cases also offer guidance. In
SId. at 527-28.
n See KFC Westem, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Acelo Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383
(8th Cii. 1989) (administrator may collec reimbursement ater government cleaned up contaminated property); United States v. Noriheastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 18th Cir. 1986) (administrator may collect an equitable award of abatement costs for persons who non-negligenily contributed to
endangerment).
7 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
76 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
"7 KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518. 523 (9th Car. 1995).
n1 49 F 3d at 523.
" Id.
10 No. CIV.5-91-760DFL/GGH, 1993 WL 217429 (E.D. CalJan. 21, 1993).
81 No. CIV.930704 PHX/PGR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXS 12190 ID. Ariz. May 24, 1994).
82 1993 WL 217429, *8.
63 Id. at *26.
* N. CI1 * 16.
8s No. CIV.934704 PHX/PGR, I994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS I2190, * I2 (D. Ariz. May 24, 1994) (emphasis added).
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Zands v. Nelson,86 the court ruled that a
citizens suit, filed to recover costs of
remediation of petroleum contaminated
soil, may be maintained under § 7002
as between successive landowners of
the property. In an extensive analysis of
the issue, the court determined thot the
language of the section and its relation-
ship to the other provisions of RCRA, in
light of the legislative history and con-
gressional intent, is such that on action
may be maintained. The court held that
a cause of action between successive
landowners advances RCRA's purpose
to protect the environment, to prevent the
dangers associated with solid waste,
and to provide appropriate incentives
for prompt cleanup when waste presents
an imminent and substantial
endangerment.87
In The Pontry v. Stop-lN-Go Foods,
Inc.,88 the court determined, in dicta,
that RCRA allows for the recovery of
remediation costs against any person
who has contributed or is contributing to
the past or present disposal of any solid
or hazardous waste. While the case
was resolved under a Kentucky state stat-
ute, the court examined relevant RCRA
provisions to determine the defendant's
liability under the Kentucky statute since
no court had ever ruled on the
provision.8
Clearly, not all courts have rejected §
7002 citizens suit claims to recover
abatement costs.90 There is no good
reason to reject citizen's claims for resti-
tution in the present case since the identi-
cal language of § 7003 has been
found to provide the remedy.
Although review of the specific lan-
guage of § 6973(a) reveals that equita-
ble restitution is not specifically set forth
as a remedy, courts have liberally
construed this section to allow restitution.
However, courts often construe the lan-
guage of § 6972(a)(1)(B) narrowly, re-
jecting equitable restitution because it is
not specifically set forth as a remedy.
That interpretation is misplaced because
courts applying substantive equity and
courts applying the low of unjust enrich-
ment are both applying a law of "good
conscience." 91
D. Cases Holding the Right to Res-
titution Does Not Exist.
While restitution has consistently
been held to be an equitable remedy
available. under § 6973, the same was
not true for private plaintiffs prior to the
adoption of the current version of §
6972(a)(1)(B). The line of cases which
interpret § 6972(a)(1)(B) as not includ-
ing a right to restitution originated out of
two cases, Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. LamphierP and Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp." Neither case ad-
dresses the current language of §
6972(a)(1)(B). 9 Prior to 1984, the only
jurisdictional powers a court had under
the provision was to "enforce such regu-
lation or order or to order the Administra-
tor to perform such act or duty as the
case may be." 95 The powers of the dis-
trict courts were very limited in scope.
Clearly, as the jurisdictional powers of
the courts were expanded after the
amendments, there is little in the case
which may be of guidance here.
A few district courts have addressed
this issue, but also in a manner that fails
to deal with current law. For example,
in Commerce Holding Co., Inc. v. Buck-
stone,96 the court rejected the argument
that the statute provided a private action
for damages. But the court in Com-
merce relies in part on § 6972(a)(1)(B)
as interpreted prior to the 1984 amend-
ments. Neither Commerce nor any of
16 797 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.Cal. 1992) (Zands 11).
8 797 F. Supp. at 816. See also Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (Zands 1l.
88 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
e 796 F. Supp. at 1178.
* See also Pine v. Shell Oil Co., CIV.A. No. 924)3468, 1993 WL 389396 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 1993).
wi D. DoBBs, lAW OF REMEDIEs 370 (2d. ed. 1993).
2 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 19831.
9 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985). The KFC decision rejected Wolls and Lamphier holding that lhey do no address.. .actions brought under § [7002]lal)l IB)
Rather, they concern actions brought under the predessor to § [7002][all 1 ([A), formerly 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). . ." 49 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 1995).
* Most defendants argue blind reliance on the holding of Wolls. Walls interpreted the long since amended language of RCRA A number of courts have
interpreted the current section, citing a number of cases which purportedly stand for the premise that § 7002 does not allow a court to award restitution for
abatement costs expended in remediating the contamination. 761 F.2d 311 (6h Cir. 19851. Some comment on the common cases cited will further illustrate the
reasons the authority should be rejected.
For example, citations to Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemical Co., 29 F.3d 148 (41h Cir. 1994), Polcha v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 837 F. Supp. 94
(M.D. Pa. 1993), and Chartrand v. Chrysler Corp., 785 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mich. 1992), are misplaced. Mulcohey's supposed holding was a statement by the
court that plaintifs agreed, in their challenge to defendant's removal petition, that they could not assert tori claims in the environmental statutes.
Similarly, the Polcho case was initially filed in the state court to recover for personal injury suffered as a result of exposure to hazardous materials. The court ruled
that personal injury damages cannot be recovered under RCRA.
The Chatrand decision is premised upon § 7002 (al ]Al. Restitution claims are filed pursuant to § 7002a( 1](8). Thus, the decision provides no guidance.
The same con be said of the Acme Printing Inc. v. Monard, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1465 (E.D. Wis. 1994) and Milbut v. Hi-Score Plant Food Co., Civ. A. No.
91-2008, 1992 WL 396774 IE.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 19921. The holding in Acme was premised on § 7002(all 1 ]Al. In Milbut the court erroneously holds that It can
order "prospectiverelief" presumably pursuant to § 7002(all 1 ([Al. 1992 WI 396774, *4. This misconstrues the section and is on unduly restrictive reading of the
Act.
In Trifler v. Hopf, No. 92 C 7193, 1994 WL 643237 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 1994), the court was convinced by the authority citing Walls v. Waste Resource
Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Or. 1985). As was discussed previously, Walls interpreted the prior language of § 7002.
9s 42 U.S.C. § 6972(1978), omended by42 U.S.C. § 6972(19841.
" 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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the other decisions directly considered
the application of the cases interpreting
§ 6973."
The court in Kaufman and Broad-
South Boy v. Unisys Corp.98 followed
that erroneous approach, dismissing the
action of the plaintiff in seeking dam-
ages or restitution because it would im-
ply a private remedy to 6972(a)(1)(B).
By referencing language from the pre-
amendment decision in Lomphier, the
court implied that it was considering §
6972(a)(1)(B) prior to the 1984 amend-
ments. The plaintiff in Kaufman argued
that the court should follow the cases in-
terpreting § 6973 which have held that
restitution is recoverable. However, the
court, with no analysis of the § 6973
cases, or the rational articulated in Con-
servation Chemical and Aceto, elected
not to consider this orgument.99
The final case which relied on Walls
is Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing
Authority v. BMI Apartments Associ-
ales.'" The court, while acknowledging
the amendment to § 7002, still relied
upon Walls, Kaufman and Commerce
Holding.
Unless a Court addresses the obvi-
ous, significant differences between the
former § 7002 and the amendment, the
weight of authority to be given the cases
cited is marginal. Merely characterizing
an award in restitution as something
other than equitable relief ignores the
voluminous authority, including Supreme
Court precedent, to the contrary.oi
Ill. POLICY CONSIDERATIONs ALSO
REQUIRE THAT CIffZENS BE ALLOWED
To RECOVER THEIR REMEDIATION COSTS
UNDER THE CmZENS' SuIr PROVIsION
OF RCRA.
The broad statutory purpose of RCRA
is clear. Congress has established a
national goal of protecting the public
from the ills associated with improper
handling of hazardous wastes:
The Congress hereby declares it
to be the national policy of the
United States that, wherever fea-
sible, the generation of hazard-
ous waste is to be reduced or
eliminated as expeditiously as
possible. Wastes that are nev-
ertheless generated should be
treated, stored or disposed of
so as to minimize the present
and future threat to human
health and the environment. 02
This policy has been recognized by
courts interpreting § 6973.i0 Allowing
restitution for costs expended by the citi-
zen in remediating the property is en-
tirely consistent with that purpose.
Citizens prosecuting actions under §
7002 seek to have the ability to perform
a cleanup first, and then recover the
costs expended. This approach is rec-
ognized under the interpretation of §
6973. It allows for prompt cleanup,
cheaper cleanup, and faster protection
to the public and environment.
Numerous policy arguments further
the broad reading of § 6972(a)(1)(B) to
allow for restitution claims upon cleanup.
For example, in many states, there are
hundreds, if not thousands, of contami-
nated sites from leaking underground
storage tanks. Some are known and
some are not. Such tanks are a small
percentage of all sites which contain
RCRA regulated wastes. Governmental
regulators will never know the exact num-
ber, location, or severity of all contami-
nated sites. Congress has recognized
this by creating statutes and amendments
whichapply rules of strict liability, joint
and several liability, and retrospectivity
regarding environmental law and
contamination.
Limited governmental resources re-
strict the ability of states and municipali-
tites from inspecting and cleaning all the
contaminated sites in its jurisdiction. It is
therefore, important for courts to recog-
nize that those parties who elect to clean
up a site first, and pursue cost recovery
against the actual polluters later, must
have the right to do so. Allowing the
cleanup to be pursued in the first in-
stance by a private party is beneficial
and serves the purposes of RCRA. The
longer a site remains contaminated, the
more expensive and involved the
cleanup. The citizen suit provision, if
read to allow individuals to recover
remediation costs through restitution, per-
mits individuals to proceed quickly while
enforcing the purposes of RCRA.
Numerous courts have held that §
6972(a)(1)(B) allows private parties to
bring suit "if generally acting as private
attorneys general rather than pursing a
private remedy."" RCRA has been
analyzed to allow the governmental
regulator to either pursue the injunction
or obtain restitution after it performs the
cleanup. Allowing a private party to
proceed with the cleanup protects both
the environment and public health. For
that party not to receive restitution under
6972(a)(1)(B), is fundamentally unfair
and inconsistent with the clear aim of
Congress.
Any interpretation of § 6972(a)(1)(B)
which does not allow a cause of action
in restitution severely limits the value of
this provision. The recognition of a pri-
vale right of action will enure to the
benefit of the citizens of the United
9 See Commerce, 749 F. Supp. of 445; Gache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
" 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
w In lighi of the KFC decision, the case has no precedenlial value since its holding has been reversed by the Ninth Circuit.
' 847 F Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 19941.
101 A number of cases have specifically held that ihe recovery of remediation cosis is equitable in nature. See Continental Insurance Co. v. Noriheasern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 19881.
'2 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b).
10 See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 739L42; Acelo, 872 F.2d at 1383; Conservation Chemical, 619 F. Supp. at 199-201.
104 Environmenial Defense Fund, Inc. v. lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983).
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States and the environment as a whole.
A citizen's claim for reimbursement is
actionable under RCRA. Congress in-
tended that §§ 7002 and 7003 be
read to provide the same remedies that
are available to the government under §
7003. As such, it is obvious that deci-
sions which have uniformly ruled §
7003 provides for restitution are control-
ling when considering claims brought
under § 7002. All circuits agree that §
6973 allows governmental entities to
pursue equitable restitution actions. No
court that has carefully considered the
issue has been able to articulate an ac-
ceptable rational for denying that right to
private parties.
IV. COMMON ARGUMENTS FOR THE
DENIAL OF RESTITUTION.
A. A Cort v. Ash Analysis Demon-
strates that Congress Did Not Intend
to Afford the Remedy of Restitution.
Recently, defendants have begun to
argue that to grant restitution, a court
must perform a Cort v. Ashios analysis to
determine whether the right is available
to a citizen under § 7002. The Eighth
Circuit recently, in Furrer v. Brown,'o6
accepted this argument in finding that
the right to restitution does not exist.
While an analysis of the Furrer decision
is outside the scope of this article, some
comment on the propriety of a Cart
analysis is appropriate.
The majority in Furrer asserted that
"[w]hen considering the possibility that it
was Congress's intent to authorize a
monetary remedy for private citizens
when it [amended § 6972]we are
guided by the teachings of the Supreme
Court. The 'familiar test' of Cart v. Ash .
. . sets out four factors relevant to the
search for an implied cause of
action.""o7 The analysis adopted ap-
pears in direct conflict with a prior
Eighth Circuit decision rejecting a Cart
analysis when determining whether a
remedy is available. It also appears to
differ with United States Supreme Court
authority that holds the "question of what
remedies are available under a statute
that provides a private right of action is
'analytically distinct' from the issue of
whether such a right exists in the first
place."108
It is clear that RCRA provides a pri-
vate right of action. Section 7002 of
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, provides that
"[e]xcept as provided in subsection Ib)
or (c) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own be-
half."109 Therefore, pursuant to Franklin,
the Eighth Circuit was in error applying
a Cort analysis because the question
was not whether a remedy was avail-
able, but whether the statute provided
for a right to sue.
A seminal case on whether Cort v.
Ash is to be used to determine the avail-
abiltiy of remedies under a given statute
is Davis v Passman."o The plaintiff
sought damages resulting from an al-
leged violation of the Fifth Amendment
rights. The district court ruled there was
noprivate right of action. The court of
appeals, using a Cort v. Ash analysis
affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed specifically holding the
appeals court erred in applying the Cort
analysis because the "question of who
may enforce a statutory right is funda-
mentally different from the question of
who may enforce a right that is pro-
tected by the Constitution.""' Although
the court noted the difference between
statutory and constitutional rights, the
Court stated the criteria set out in Cort
was "for ascertaining whether a private
cause of action may be implied from 'a
statute not expressly providing one.""' 2
Justice Brennan, in the opinion, exam-
ined the origins of the term "cause of
action" noting the distinction between
the ability to "invoke the power of the
courts" and the availability of relief."'
Therefore, the "concept of a 'cause of
action' is employed specifically to deter-
mine who may judicially enforce the
statutory rights or obligations."'"'^ Thus,
the question of whether a cause of ac-
tion is available is different than whether
a particular remedy is available.
By using the Cort analysis, Furrer also
runs afoul of Eighth Circuit authority. In
Miener v.Stote of Missouri,"s the court
held that the determination of whether
there is a cause of action for a particular
remedy, is a "two step analysis. We
ask first whether a private cause of ac-
tion may be asserted pursuant to the
statutes named in [the] complaint. As a
separate question, we examine the
propriety of [the] relief.""' 6
In a citizens' suit action, the answer
to the first question is clear. RCRA pro-
vides that "any" person" 7 may file suit.
'a 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
10 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
10r Id. at 1094.
1os Franklin v. Gwinnell County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Accord Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (71h Cir. 1981).
i" 42 U.S.C. § 6972. (emphasis addedl.
110 442 U.S. 226 (1979).
"i 442 U.S. at 24 1.
112 442 U.S. at 24001.
"' Id. at 239. Footnote 18 of the decision is particularly illustrative. There, the court notes tha "cause of action is a question whether a particular plaintiff is a
member of a class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, oppropiotely invoke the power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal
court may make available." Id. a n. 18.
114 Id.
115 673 F.2d 969 (8h Cir. 1982).
116 673 F.2d at 973.
" The Furer decision intimates that the appellants do not fall within the class of persons that ihe statue empowers to file suit. This intimation has no basis under the
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Therefore, the first question is answered
in the affirmative. The court then is obli-
gated to conduct the second step of the
analysis.
Of particular significance is Miener's
rejection of a Cart analysis in determin-
ing whether a particular form of relief is
available under a statute. The Court ac-
knowledged that "[a]lthough some courts
have assessed the availability of dam-
ages under a Cort v. Ash analysis . . .
we eschew this approach in favor to the
narrower focus adopted in Anderson v.
Thompson."" 8
In Miener, plaintiff brought an action
to secure rights due her as a handi-
capped person under a number of stat-
utes and constitutional provisions. The
district court properly used a Cort analy-
sis to determine that a private cause of
action existed pursuant to § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act."' There was no
dispute that a second statute at issue, the
Education Act,i 20 provided for a private
cause of action in the federal courts.
Having determined that the cause of
action existed under both statutes, the
court turned its attention to the issue of
available relief. In rejecting a Cart
analysis when examining the availability
of remedies under the Education Act the
court said, "Congress has expressly cre-
ated a cause of action in Section 615 of
the Act and has empowered the district
court to grant 'such relief as the court
determines is appropriate." 2i Accord-
ingly, the question is simply whether
damages are within the relief foreseen
by Congress."l 22
The principle, that Cort v. Ash is in-
applicable when the only question to be
addressed is the availability of a particu-
lar remedy, has been addressed by the
Seventh Circuit as well. In a case
similar to Miener, that circuit also re-
jected a Cort analysis. In Anderson v.
Thompson,123 the court held that the
"availability of a damage remedy . . . is
a matter ofstatutory interpretation. What
must ultimately be determined is whether
Congress intended to create the remedy
asserted by the plaintiffs."' 24
The court distinguished Cart by not-
ing the "analysis is not appropriate
because the issue is not whether there is
an implied private right of action . . .
Here Congress has expressly created a
cause of action and empowered the dis-
trict court to grant 'such relief as the
court determines appropriate'. . .The
question is whether damages are
'appropriate relief.'"1 25
The flaw in the Cort argument is
readily apparent. The case has no ap-
plication because there was no express
statutory cause of action available to the
plaintiff who sought relief. In Cart, a
stockholder brought an action for injunc-
tive relief and a derivative claim for dam-
ages, alleging violation of a statute
which prohibited corporate expenditures
in federal election campaigns. The court
held that the plaintiff had no right to the
relief requested under the section.126
Congress, in the statute at issue in
Cort, unlike § 7002 of RCRA, provided
no private right of action to a citizen.
Such a right is, however, explicit in
RCRA § 7002. Thus, the argument that
a Cart analysis is appropriate foils, be-
cause the court need not decide if the
citizen has the Congressional authority
to enforce RCRA.V' Rather, the court
need only determine if restitution is within
Act because the definition of "person" found at 42 U.S.C. 6903 (151 in no way excludes an "owner" from coverage under the Act.
Further, as the Supreme Court noted in Franklin, it is not relevant to the Cort factor analysis whether the plaintiff is one of the class of people for whom the special
Ienelit of the statute was enacted because the statue provides an expressed right of action. Franklin v. Gwinnel County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (19921.
"1 Miener v. Slate of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982). See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
' 29 U.S.C. 794.
120 20 U.S.C. § 1415 Ie]I2).
121 Id.
1" Miener, 673 F.2d at 979.
123 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981)
124 658 F.2d at 1210.
'2 Id. at n.7.
126 § 610. Contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations or labor organizations.
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in
connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or polilical convention or caucus held to select candidates
for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election
atwhich Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any
candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $5,000;
and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or
labor organization, as the case may be, and any person who accepts or receives any contribution, in violation of this section, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more ihan one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years or both. . .
Title 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 ed. and Supp. Ill).
127 The Supreme Court, in Cort, ruled that to determine if a private remedy is implicit in a statute not specifically providing one, the relevant factors are: 1) is plaintiff
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted? 2) is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy,
or deny one? 31 is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for plaintiff? and 41 is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of aclion based solely on federal law? Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Even under this analysis, appellants must be awardedrestitution. First, RCRA § 7002 clearly granis the appellants, as citizens, the right to bring the action below.
Thus, Congress has indicated that civil enforcement is available. Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1987). Factor I is satisfied.
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the equitable authority expressly con-
ferred upon the district court under §
7002. Settled rules of statutory construc-
tion strongly indicate that restitution is
within that authority.
B. The Fact That the Statute Does
Not Specifically Mention the Right to
Restitution Does Not Exclude it.
Defendants, in various forms, urge
the courts to adopt the view that be-
cause the language of § 7002 does not
specifically state the courts shall have the
power to order restitution, the power
does not exist. Such a position is with-
out any support in the law, particularly
when the plain language of the legisla-
tive history is considered.
It is undeniable that the powers con-
ferred upon the district courts by § 7002
of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA), are equitable in nature,
thus empowering those courts with
authority to fashion appropriate relief. In
United States v. Price," the court found
that RCRA was "intended to confer upon
the courts the authority to grant affirma-
tive equitable relief to the extent neces-
sary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic
wastes." 129
This authority has been widely inter-
preted to confer upon the courts the
authority, under § 7002, to award citi-
zens "equitable-type relief." Dominick's
Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.i'
Since the statute bears Congress' inten-
tion to entrust the courts with wide
equitable powers, the courts should
exercise that authority in a manner that
promotes the underlying purpose of equi-
table relief; fairness as between plaintiffs
and defendants. In most instances, that
remedy is restitution of the abatement
costs expended by the citizen.
If a court were to rule that the former
owners of the contaminated property
have no liability under RCRA to contrib-
ute to the remediation of the contamina-
tion resulting from their use of the
property, it would pose a patently unjust
result. The full burden of remediation
would fall upon the backs of the citizen,
whose only basis of liability for the con-
tamination at the property is that they
owned it at the time the problem was
discovered. This result, besides being
fundamentally unfair, would directly con-
tradict the intent of our nation's environ-
mental statutes which is to have
responsible parties pay to rerediate.131
C. The Enactment of Subtitle I of
RCRA Does Not Limit the Right to File
a Citizens' Suit Under § 7002
A number a defendants have raised
the novel issue that petroleum leaks from
underground storage tank are not gov-
erned by the citizens' suit provision of
RCRA citing Winston v. Shell."'
Defendants argue that because petro-
leum contaminated soil is classified as a
"regulated substance" under Subtitle I of
RCRA and not regulated under Subtitle
C, that only USEPA or the states can sue
to abate the conditions. This position is
erroneous.
First, the cases have consistently held,
both prior and subsequent to Winston,
that petroleum wastes are subject to suit
under § 7002 because the wastes are
considered solid wastes subject to suit.
In, Zands v. Nelson.' and Dominick's
Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,"
the defendants were sued pursuant to §
7002 of RCRA for injury resulting from
contamination from underground, petro-
leum storage tanks. In both cases, the
defendants raise Subtitle I as a bar to
the relief claimed by the plaintiffs. In
both cases, the courts rejected the defen-
dant's claims.
In Zands, the court analyzed the pur-
poses of the two sections and concluded
that "setting up a special system for un-
derground storage tanks in § 6991
does not necessarily indicate that gaso-
line leaks could not be included within
the rest of RCRA. An equally plausible
alternative is that § 6991 simply pro-
vides an additional means for dealing
with this specific type of problem, and
the Court is of the opinion this is the
case here." 35
In Dominick's, the Court opined that
while Subtitle I provides specific regula-
tion of underground storage tanks, it
does not state it is the "exclusive remedy
for petroleum leaks from underground
tanks."136 The Court further noted that §
7002 "expressly sets forth . . . excep-
tions to a private citizens right to bring
suit . . .",3 Clearly, Winston runs afoul
of the better reasoned opinions of earlier
decisions. 138
Second, there is explicit legislative intent to create a right of restitution. The legislative history clearly states the section is to be read the same as § 7003 where
the right to restitution is undeniably granted. Id. Factor 2 is satisfied.
Third, granting restitution is consistent with ihe underlying legislative scheme to clean the hazards associated with the improper disposal of waste. Allowing a
citizen to remediate first is the most efficieni way to remediate. To atfirm the decision below will only serve to slow further the time necessary to begin remediatlion.
Id. Factor 3 is satisfied.
Fourth, the cause of action is premised on violations of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Consistency requires the development of federat
law to ensure consistent application of site remediation. Id. Factor 4 is satisfied.
Thus, even under the Coi analysis, appellants should be awarded their abatement costs under RCRA.
'2 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
i2 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). See also Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991).
o No. 93 C 4210, 1993 WL 524808, n.5 (N.D. 1Il. Dec. 15, 1993).
i See KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Or. 1995).
as 861 F. Supp. 713 (C,.D. Ill. 1994).
'" 779 F. Supp. 1254 IS.D. Cal. 1991).
'" 1993 WL 524808.
'" 779 F. Supp. at 1263.
136 1993 WL 524808, *3.
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Similarly, in Agricultural Excess & Sur-
plus Ins. Co. v. A.B.D. Tank & Pump
Co.,139 the court rejected the holding of
the Winston court that Subtitle IX (RCRA's
Subtitle 1) was the "exclusive, means for
addressing problems with underground
storage tanks."140 The court concluded
that "the regulation of petroleum leakage
from underground storage tanks under
Subchapter IX [does not] prohibit civil
enforcement suits under Subchapter
VII."' The court rendered its decision
after thoroughly examining the decision
in Edison Electric Institute v. E.P.A.,1 42
also cited by many defendants, holding
that the "Edison's court reasoning does
not require this Court to conclude that
Subchapter IX of the RCRA precludes
private civil enforcement suits."A 3
The court expressed its agreement
with the court in Zands v. Nelson,14A
which found that the exclusion of petro-
leum from CERCIA's definition of
"hazardous substance" does not mean it
is excluded from the RCRA definition of
"hazardous" or "solid waste." In other
words, the court rejected Shell's conten-
tion that petroleum "is not meant to be
regulated as a hazardous or solid
substance."' 4 -
Returning to Edison, the court went
on to hold that "even given Edison's di-
rection" that petroleum should be regu-
lated under Subtitle I, "no section of
Subchapter IX prohibits civil enforcement
suits." 146 Allowing a suit to address pe-
troleum contamination is not inconsistent
with the specific delegations given to the
Administrator and the States. Further-
more, it is not inconsistent with the limito-
tion of the right of a citizen to bring a
suit if an action is being prosecuted by
the government. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that "[clivil enforcement suits
brought pursuant to Subchapter VI §
6972(a) would merely supplement the
federal enforcement provisions of Sub-
chapter IX."' 47 As has been noted else-
where, the legislative history of the
citizens' suit provision states it is de-
signed to supplement government en-
forcement of RCRA.i 4s
In another recent decision, Craig Lyle
Limited Partnership v. Land O'Lakes,
Inc.,i 49 the court rejected the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgement
which alleged that "gasoline and petro-
leum . . . are useful energy sources. 1is
The Court ruled that there "is. no provi-
sion prohibiting citizen suits based on
UST petroleum leaks or spills."'
Defendants assert that the EPA's deci-
sion not to regulate media containing
petroleum as the result of a UST release
as a hazardous waste likewise removed
such media from Subtitle D regulation
(42 U.S.C. §§ 6941 - 6949a) as a
solid waste. This position ignores the
regulatory definitions of solid and haz-
ardous wastes.
The Code of Regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 261.1 (b) provides:
(1) The definition of solid
waste contained in this port
applies only to wastes that also
are hazardous for purposes of
the regulations implementing
Subtitle C of RCRA.
(2) This part identifies ony
some of the materials which are
solid wastes and hazardous
wastes under sections 3007,
3013, and 7003 of RCRA. A
material which is not defined as
a solid waste in this port, or is
not a hazardous waste identi-
fied or listed in this part, is still a
solid waste and a hazordous
waste for purposes of these sec-
tions if:
(ii) In the case of section
7003, the statutory elements are
established. Emphasis added.
The fact that petroleum may not be de-
fined as a hazardous waste under 40
C.F.R. § 261.1, does not mean it is not
a solid waste for citizens' suit enforce-
ment purposes. Following this logic, the
court in Craig Lyle found petroleum a
solid waste subject to citizens suit
enforcement.15 2
Defendants rely too, on the decision
in Edison Electric Institute v. E.P.A., 53 for
the proposition that petroleum not be
subject to citizen suit enforcement. A
careful reading of Edison discloses no
support for this position.
First, nothing in the case indicates the
court held that Subtitle I is the sole
137' Id
18 See alo Paper Recycling, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 856 F. Supp. 671, 675 IN.D. Ga. 19931 (which found that petroleum which has leaked from on
underground storage tank is a solid waste subject to citizens' suits).
I No. 94 C 2854, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1871 (N.D. III Feb. 14, 19951.
140 id o * I2.
41 Id at * 16.
142 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
1" 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1871, 16-17.
14 797 F Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992).
145 No. 94 C 2854, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1871, *17 (N.D. III Feb. 14, 1995).
146 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXtS 1871, *19-*20.
17 id. at *2)1.
"I See supro text accompanying notes 6.15.
149 877 F Supp. 476 (D.Minn. 1995).
110 Id. at 48 1.
151 Id
152 td.
153 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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enforcement scheme for UST petroleum
contamination. Rather, the court merely
held that EPA's deferral is permissible
under the statute.'"
Second, the issue of the application
of the citizens' suit provision is nowhere
addressed. In fact, as noted above,
finding such suits are available to citi-
zens furthers the legislative purpose that
citizen action will supplement govern-
ment enforcement. Congress intended
that § 7002 be used to enforce Subtitle
1. In the Joint Explanatory Statements of
the Committee of Conference regarding
the 1984 amendments, the report
stated:
[t]he Conference substitute pro-
vides that the applicable provi-
sions of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, including Sections
7002 and 7003.[42 U.S.C.§§ 6972, 6973] may be used
to enforce Title I [U.S.C. §§
6991 et seq.] and specifically
excludes application of Section
3008 [42 U.S.C. § 6928] to
Subtitle 1.155
Finally, the USEPA reports that over
"300,000 petroleum releases would be
subject discovered and subjected to Sub-
title I's corrective action requirements," it
follows that they should be subject to citi-
zens' suits because, "the right to bring
citizens' suits is deliberately redundant of
other statutory protections: Congress
believed that by giving citizens them-
selves the power to enforce these provi-
sions by suing violators directly, they
could speed compliance with environ-
mental laws, as well as put pressure
upon a government that was unable or
unwilling to enforce such laws itself." 16
Allowing citizens to sue and recover
abatement costs would aid the govern-
ment in discovering and remediating
these 300,000 sites. Clearly the prob-
lem is acute and the purposes of the citi-
zens' suit provision will be served by
rejecting arguments on this issue.
D. Since RCRA is Equitable, a Citi-
zen Need Not Prove an Existing Immi-
nent and Substantial Endangerment
Defendants argue that citizens cannot
prove an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment. The effect of this position is
likely lessened with the decisions in KFC
and Boyless where these arguments
were specifically rejected. The reason-
ing of those decisions together with the
cases interpreting the language of §
7003, are instructive.
In Conservation Chemical Company,
the court specifically held that "the recov-
ery of costs incurred by the [U.S.] pursu-
ant to its activities under RCRA may be
an appropriate form of relief in an action
brought pursuant to RCRA Section
7003."' 1s The language which affords
the courts jurisdiction to hear RCRA
cases is identical in §§ 7002 and
7003, so it is clear that § 7002 affords
a citizen.the opportunity to recover their
remediation costs under the equitable
remedy of restitution. Since Conserva-
tion was a cost recovery case, it follows
that a current imminent and substantial
endangerment need not exist.
In Aceto, the United States alleged
the defendants were "liable for response
costs incurred at the . . . site pursuant to
section 7003 of [RCRA]."is The defen-
dants argued that because "EPA
cleaned up . . . before it brought suit,
there was (and is) no 'imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment' as is required
under the Act."'s9 The Court rejected
that position. It would appear that the
defendants challenged the EPA's claim
to reimbursement under RCRA because
the defendants raised the issue that there
could be no right to restitution if there
was no pending "imminent and substan-
tial endangerment."
The cases interpreting § 7003 have
uniformly held that the government need
not wait until the court issues an injunc-
tion to take action at the site.lW Such a
procedural requirement frustrates, rather
than advances, the purpose of RCRA.
Citizens should not be punished for ei-
ther following the edicts of agencies re-
quiring remedial action or for voluntarily
remediating hazardous conditions.
V. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 7002
DOES NOT lIT THE RIGHT TO REUEF
AWARDED To EQUITABLE REUEFl 6 1
It is conceded that the cases interpret-
ing the language of RCRA have uni-
formly held that the statute is equitable in
nature. However, there is nothing in the
language of the citizens' suit provision
which limits the relief to equitable relief.
A primary tenet of statutory construc-
tion is that the English rules of grammar
are presumed to have been known by
the legislature.i6 2 That being so, it is
clear that the plain language of the pro-
vision in question is not limited to equita-
ble relief.
Examining the language of §
7002(a)(1)(B), if the inconsequential ele-
ments of the provision are eliminated, the
section provides the court with jurisdic-
tion to enforce the provisions of RCRA,
restrain those participating in the han-
dling of waste, order those persons to
take such other action, or, award
15 Id.
'" H.R. Cow. REP. No. 1133, 981h Cong., 2d Sess. 12711984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5698.
1 Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Industries, 9 F. Supp. 1174, n.2 (6th Cir. 1993).
'n United Slates v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 201 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (emphasis added).
'" United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1989).
'" Id. at 1383 (emphosis in the original).
160 See also United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Or. 19821; United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceulical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8h Cir. 1986).161 The authors appreciale the comments of Dr. Dale Haskell, Assistant Professor of English, Southeast Missouri State University, on the grammatical construction of
the statutory language.
162 United States v. Goldberg, N.Y., 168 U.S. 95 (18971.
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penalties as appropriate. The grammati-
cal construction of the statute employed
by Congress in its predicate are a series
of coordinate infinitive verb phrases in
parallel structure. In other words, the
section spells out four options available
to the court; each one independent. Be-
cause "[a] comma is the mark ordinarily
used to separate coordinate words,
phrases, or clauses in a list or series"163
under § 7002 a court may do a number
of things, only one of which is injunctive
in nature.
It is significant that there is no adjec-
tive preceding the term "such other or-
der" which would limit the type of order
to injunctive relief. Rather the term
speaks of generic orders to "takesuch
other action as may be necessary." Pre-
sumably, an award of damages would
fall within the broad category of "other
action."
This proposition is buttressed by the
phrase "or both" which immediately fol-
lows the phrases "to restrain" and "to
order." The phrase, "or both" supposes
that the two preceding phrases are inde-
pendent. Thus, a court has broader
powers rather than limited authority as
many courts have stated.
Finally, "words must be accorded
their normal meanings. . .and it is ap-
propriate to assume that ordinary mean-
ing of those words accurately express
legislative purpose." 16 If Congress had
intended to limit the court's jurisdiction to
equitable orders, it could have added
an adjective which limits the broad lan-
guage of the provision.
A number of other factors support the
contention that the statute must be read
to include legal damages for remedia-
tion. First, the pre-1984 language of §
7002 provided jurisdiction only to
"enforce" regulations or orders, or, to
"order the Administrator to perform" acts
or duties. These particular powers did
not require a court to award damages
since injunctions were all that was neces-
sary to accomplish the courts' mission
under the Act prior to the 1984
amendments.
Second, there is a presumption
against a construction of a statute which
renders the statute ineffective or ineffi-
cient.165 Any decision denying remedia-
tion costs renders the citizens suit
provision of RCRA ineffective and ineffi-
cient. There is no reason for private citi-
zens toremedy hazardous sites, either
with or without the prodding of the gov-
ernment, if there is no potential for the
citizen to recover costs from I'iable par-
ties. In the event a citizen would choose
to ignore an administrative order to
clean a site, litigation would surely fol-
low. The overall result would be delays
in undertaking cleanups and a drain on
the revenues and resources of the gov-
ernment to track down missing responsi-
ble parties and to litigate the liabilities. .
A citizen, when confronted with the
discovery of contamination, has two
choices; either cleanup the site or sue
under § 7002 seeking an order direct-
ing other parties to remediate. Clearly,
even by the terms of the decisions deny-
ing restitution, citizens could opt for the
former and avoid the financial loss.
Since prompt cleanup is one of the Act's
primary purposes, the plaintiffs should
not be penalized for acting in a
responsible manner, e.g., remediate
now, determine liability later.
The more efficient method of advanc-
ing the purpose of !CRA 1 ot a site is to
remediate first and allocate the liabilities
later. Contrary decisions serve, particu-
larly with respect to petroleum contami-
nated sites, to bring site cleanups to a
standstill.
It is clear that under principles of
statutory construction, and the rules of
English grammar, the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is not limited to injunctive
relief under RCRA's citizens' suit provi-
sion. The courts are given the authority
to "order such person to take such other
actions as may be necessary." The
phrase does not limit the court's ability to
award money damages for costs in-
curred in remediation.
V. CONCLUSION
Early in our lives we are taught to
clean up our rooms and put our toys
away. Unfortunately, these simple les-
sons are overlooked by adults because
the stakes are exceptionally high in terms
of costs and strategic planning.
However, there is nothing in RCRA
which forgives the recalcitrant party for
ignoring their obligations to leave the
property they use in the some condition
as they found it. Clearly, the language
of this environmental statute promotes the
concept that the polluter pays. There is
significant law, policy, and equities
which would require the polluter to revisit
the lessons from kindergarten, and clean
up after themselves.
' JVA W. CORDER &JoHNJ. RusZmrEw2, HANDBOOK OF CURENT ENGUSH 218 ISconl Foresman, 81h ed. 1989).
i" United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (81h Cir. 1987).
16 Sunon v. United States, 819 F. 2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 19871.
'" Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Industries, 9 F.3d 1174 (6h Cir. 1993) (the court notes that the right to bring citizens suits is deliberately redundant of
other statutory protections: Congress believed that by giving citizens themselves the power to enforce theses provisions by suing violators directly, they could speed
compliance wilh environmental laws, as well as put pressure upon a government Ihat was unable or unwilling to enforce such laws itself).
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